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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the Coalition for Fair Trade in Ripe Olives (CFTRO),
representing United States-based ripe olive producers, alleged that
imports of ripe olives from Spain were sold below their fair value in
the United States (US), thereby harming US producers.1 The CFTRO
petitioned the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) to
confirm these allegations.2 The CFTRO also alleged that Spanish
producers and exporters of ripe olives were benefiting from
countervailable subsidies from Spain or the European Union (EU).3
Commerce’s investigations found the CFTRO’s allegations of
sales at less than fair value and the use of countervailable subsidies
to be true, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) found that
the domestic industry was materially injured, and Commerce
consequently ordered anti-dumping and countervailing duties to be

1. Ripe Olives from Spain: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation,
82 Fed. Reg. 33,054, 33,054–55 (July 19, 2017).
2. Id.
3. Ripe Olives from Spain: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 82
Fed. Reg. 33,050, 33,050, 33,052 (July 19, 2017).
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assessed.4 In response to Commerce’s actions, the EU requested
consultations at the World Trade Organization (WTO), alleging
violations of various WTO agreements.5 The US and EU were unable
to resolve their dispute through bilateral consultations at the WTO,
and, at the EU’s request, the WTO established and constituted a
Dispute Settlement Body panel to resolve the dispute.6
This Comment argues that the US met the requirements necessary
to sustain an anti-dumping injury determination under Article 3 of
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter “ADA”). Contrary
to the EU’s allegations that the US did not properly consider volume,
price effects, and the causal relationship between the injury and the
dumped imports, the US’ anti-dumping determination is valid under
the requirements of Article 3 of the ADA.7 This Comment also
argues that the injury the ITC found due to the subsidies granted to
Spanish olive farmers is invalid under Article 2 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter “SCM”). The
US’ countervailing duties on ripe olives imported from Spain,
specifically those in response to subsidies to Spanish olive farmers
4. See Ripe Olives from Spain: Amended Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, 83 Fed. Reg. 37,469, 37,470
(Aug. 1, 2018) (discussing the ITC’s notice to Commerce that the olive imports
from Spain did result in material injury, as alleged); Ripe Olives from Spain:
Antidumping Duty Order, 83 Fed. Reg. 37,465, 37,465 (Aug. 1, 2018) (detailing
the anti-dumping order issued by Commerce in response to the ITC’s finding that a
US industry was materially injured).
5. See Request for Consultations by the European Union, United States –
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from Spain, 1–2, WTO
Doc. WT/DS577/1 (Jan. 31, 2019) (focusing primarily on GATT 1994 Article VI
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
6. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union,
United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from
Spain 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS577/3 (May 17, 2019) (requesting a panel due to the
failure to resolve the dispute); Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request
of the European Union, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
on Ripe Olives from Spain, WTO Doc. WT/DS577/4 (Oct. 21, 2019) (establishing
said panel).
7. But see Request for Consultations by the European Union, supra note 5, at
2 (asserting that the ITC’s claims and the antidumping orders are inconsistent with
the parties’ obligations under GATT and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures).
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under the EU’s Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) and the related
Sustainable Land Use subsidy (hereinafter “Greening”), violate the
SCM because the subsidies are not specific, as required by Article 2
of the SCM.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the details of the ITC’s
material-injury determination regarding dumped imports as well as
Commerce’s determination whether countervailable subsidies were
involved in the production of Spanish ripe olives. The background
discussion will also include facts and legal analyses from prior WTO
disputes dealing with the validity of an anti-dumping injury
determination and whether a subsidy is de jure specific. Part III of
this paper will analogize and distinguish the facts of US – Ripe
Olives from Spain from the prior WTO disputes that analyzed antidumping injury and de jure specificity determinations under Article 3
of the ADA and Article 2.1 of the SCM, respectively.
Part IV recommends a solution to the instant dispute and two
forward-looking actions meant to reduce future ambiguity and
potentially lower the odds of future trade disputes.
Finally, Part V concludes that the US’ anti-dumping duties on ripe
olives imported from Spain are valid, and unless the US rescinds its
countervailing duties on the same goods, the US is in direct violation
of the SCM.

II. BACKGROUND
First, this section provides information on Commerce’s antidumping and countervailing duty findings regarding ripe olives from
Spain. Second, it provides details on the EU’s Basic Payment
Scheme and Greening subsidies that were at issue in this dispute.
Third, it discusses the underlying law in the ADA Article 3 and the
SCM Article 2.1. Fourth, it introduces prior WTO panel reports that
clarify the Agreements applicable to this dispute.

A. THE ITC FOUND DUMPED RIPE OLIVES FROM SPAIN TO BE
MATERIALLY INJURING DOMESTIC RIPE OLIVE PRODUCERS.
The CFTRO petitioned Commerce to confirm whether imports of
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ripe olives from Spain (“subject imports”) were sold below their fair
value in the US, thereby harming US producers.8 To calculate
dumping margins that would confirm the existence of dumping,
Commerce compared the export price and constructed export price of
the subject goods to the normal value of ripe olives over the period
of investigation (POI).9 After Commerce found that ripe olives from
Spain were, in fact, dumped on the US market, the ITC proceeded
with an injury determination.10 First, the ITC examined the volume
of the dumped imports: during the POI, the volume of subject
imports increased from 35,037 short tons in 2015 to 35,139 short
tons in 2016, and then declined to 32,782 short tons in 2017. 11 Also
examining market share in its volume analysis, the ITC looked at the
different distribution channels of ripe olives in the US and found that
the quantity of subject imports sold to the US retail sector increased
during the POI.12 Between 2015–2017, the volume of importers’
shipments to retailers increased from 2,231 short tons to 5,259 short
tons, a 135% increase.13 The ITC concluded the volume of subject
imports from Spain was “significant in absolute terms and relative to
both apparent U.S. consumption and U.S. production.”14
8. See Ripe Olives from Spain: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value
Investigation, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,054, 33,054–55 (July 19, 2017); see also Agreement
on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT] (defining “dumping”).
9. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., Decision Memorandum for
the Preliminary Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of Ripe
Olives
from
Spain,
4–11
(Jan.
18,
2018),
https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/spain/2018-01447-1.pdf
(explaining
that Commerce would begin its analysis by using a differential pricing analysis
before moving to the standard average-to-average method as the latter has the
potential to mask dumping in its calculations); see also Ripe Olives from Spain:
Notice of Correction to Antidumping Duty Order, 83 Fed. Reg. 39,691, 39,692
(Aug. 10, 2018) (listing the weighed-average dumping margins in percentages,
including 16.88% for Angel Camacho, 17.46% below for Aceitunas Guadalquivir,
and 25.50% below for Agro Sevilla).
10. Ripe Olives from Spain, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-582 and 731-TA-1377, USITC
Pub. 4805, at 1 (July 1, 2018) (Final) [hereinafter ITC Investigations].
11. Id. at 18.
12. Id. at 18–19.
13. Id. at IV-14.
14. Id. at 19.
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Second, the ITC examined the dumped imports’ effect on prices in
the domestic market. Ripe olives from Spain, in thirty-seven out of
forty-eight quarterly price comparisons, undersold US-produced ripe
olives.15 During the POI there were no significant changes in the
price of domestically produced ripe olives (the domestic “like good”)
due to the imported ripe olives from Spain, either significantly
depressing domestic ripe olive prices or preventing domestic ripe
olive price increases that would have otherwise occurred.16 While
evaluating price effects, the ITC considered the substitutability (i.e.,
interchangeability) of Spanish and domestic ripe olives; the ITC
found that they were highly substitutable, inclusive of different
grades of ripe olives.17 The substitutability of the grades of imported
and domestic ripe olives allowed the ITC to compare Spanish and
domestic prices without segmenting them by grade.18
Third, the ITC examined the state of the domestic ripe olive
industry over the POI to determine the impact of the subject goods.19
The ITC found stable production capacity, increased volume of
production, increased capacity utilization, decreased domestic
shipments, lower sales quantity and value, increased inventories,
mixed employment metrics, lower net and operating incomes, lower
capital expenditures, lower research and development expenditures,
higher net assets, and lower operating return on assets.20 For finding
injury by the subject goods, the ITC focused on the lower sales,
income, domestic shipments, and producers’ increased inventories.21
15. Id. at 20.
16. Id. at 21–22 (noting that prices of domestic ripe olives increased during the
POI).
17. See id. at 17, I-10–I-11, II-11–II-12.
18. See id. (discussing the grades and substitutability of ripe olives, finding
dumped and domestic ripe olives highly substitutable); see also Appellate Body
Report, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubing (“HP-SSST”) from Japan, ¶ 5.262, WTO Doc.
WT/DS454/AB/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report,
China – HP-SSST] (explaining that the “competitive relationship between
products” must be assessed to determine whether the products fall within the same
market and that no material injury could take place if the imported goods are not
substitutable for the domestic, like goods).
19. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 22–24, n.139.
20. Id. at 22–24.
21. Id. at 23–24.
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Though the Spanish olives had no effect on prices of US-produced
ripe olives, the dumped imports captured market share from domestic
producers, contributing to these negative indicia.22 A high degree of
substitutability between the Spanish and domestic ripe olives
facilitated the market share capture because there was not much to
differentiate the two goods other than price; apart from price,
Spanish and US ripe olives are readily interchangeable. 23 The sale of
dumped Spanish olives at prices lower than US-produced ripe olives
was concurrent with increased volume of imports, increased Spanish
shipments to retailers, and decreased US-producer share of
shipments to retailers.24
In examining the impact of the subject goods on domestic
producers, the ITC had to ensure it was not wrongly attributing ripe
olives from Spain as the cause of the injuries to the domestic
industry.25 To ensure that it was not mistaken that the lower sales,
income, domestic shipments, and producers’ increased inventories
were due to subject imports, the ITC examined other factors injuring
the domestic industry during the POI, namely the decrease in
domestic apparent consumption and increase in imports of ripe olives
from countries other than Spain.26 The ITC found neither of these
other factors to explain US producers’ decreased performance
because the “relatively modest decline in apparent US consumption
was smaller than the declines in shipments, net sales, and operating
and net income experienced by the domestic industry,” and nonsubject imports captured market share from domestic producers only
in the institutional distribution channel.27 In addition, the respondents
in the ITC investigation alleged the domestic industry suffered due to
supply constraints, but the ITC found no supply constraints affecting
domestic producers.28
After examining volume, price effects, and the state of domestic
producers, the ITC found that the volume and low prices of imported
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 24.
Id. at II-17–II-19.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 24–26.
Id.
Id.
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ripe olives from Spain had a significant impact on the domestic
injury, especially in the retail sector, the most important sector for
domestic producers.29 Specifically, the ITC found that domestic ripe
olive producers lost profit during the POI and had to carry increased
inventories, and were, therefore, materially injured.30

B. COMMERCE FOUND THAT ACCESS TO BPS AND GREENING WAS
LIMITED TO SPANISH OLIVE FARMERS BECAUSE OF HISTORIC TIES
TO FORMER SUBSIDIES THAT WERE FOR OLIVE FARMING.
Two of the subsidies that Commerce investigated were BPS and
Greening.31 The CFTRO alleged that these subsidies were reducing
financial performance and reducing production in the domestic
industry.32 BPS and Greening are programs under the EU’s Common
Agricultural Policy that pay income support directly to farmers; BPS
is the foundational means of income support for farmers and
Greening is for farmers to use to meet the EU’s environment and
climate goals.33
29. Id. at 24, 26.
30. Id.
31. See Petition for the Imposition of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
Pursuant to Sections 701 and 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended, Volume
III at 10, Ripe Olives from Spain, DOC Inv. No. C-469-818 (June 21, 2017)
(asking for the investigation of BPS and related programs).
32. Ripe Olives from Spain: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 82
Fed. Reg. 33,050, 33,052 (July 19, 2017) (alleging “reduced market share,
underselling and price suppression or depression, lost sales and revenues, adverse
impact on the domestic industry, including financial performance, production, and
capacity utilization, and reduction in olive acreage under cultivation”).
33. See
Income
Support
Explained,
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agriculturalpolicy/income-support/income-support-explained_en (last visited July 23, 2020)
(discussing the purpose of providing direct payments to farmers throughout the
EU);
Sustainable
Land
Use
(Greening),
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agriculturalpolicy/income-support/greening_en (last visited July 23, 2020) (explaining that
farmers are rewarded for preserving natural resources and providing public goods
through crop diversification, maintenance of permanent grassland, and dedication
of arable land to improve biodiversity); The Basic Payment, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agriculturalpolicy/income-support/basic-payment_en (last visited July 23, 2020) (elucidating
that farmers are granted funding through the annual activation of payment
entitlements); see also Regulation 1307/2013, of the European Parliament and of
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BPS and Greening have historical ties to subsidies coupled to
production of particular agricultural goods, and this is what led
Commerce to consider BPS and Greening to be specific subsidies.34
When BPS and Greening took effect in 2015, Spain, like each EU
member state, had to set the subsidy rates per hectare (the
“entitlement rate”).35 The entitlement rates under BPS were derived
from BPS’s predecessor subsidies received by the particular farmer:
that is, the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) and its predecessor, in the
case of olive farmers, the Common Organization of Markets in Fats
and Oils, which was a specific subsidy.36 Greening payments are an
annually adjusted percentage of the BPS payment, typically around
fifty percent.37 However, eligibility for BPS and Greening is not
limited to farmers of a specific agricultural product; the farmers need
only undertake agricultural activity on one or more hectares of land.38
the Council of 17 December 2013 on Establishing Rules for Direct Payments to
Farmers under Support Schemes within the Framework of the Common
Agricultural Policy and Repealing Council Regulation 637/2008 and Council
Regulation 73/2009, 2013 O.J. (L 347) 608, 613 (stating that the farming practices
supported by Greening are compulsory in EU member states).
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., Decision Memorandum for
the Preliminary Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Ripe
Olives
from
Spain,
24,
26
(Nov.
20,
2017),
https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/spain/2017-25660-1.pdf
[hereinafter
Preliminary Countervailing Memo] (“[B]ecause the crop type determines the grant
amounts provided under this program due to the direct reliance on the grant
amounts provided under previous programs, which based grant amounts on the
crop type. As such, the program is specific to olive growers.”).
35. See Royal Decree Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme
Entitlements of the Common Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1076)
(Spain) (laying out the calculation of the BPS entitlements for farmers in Spain).
36. See Council Regulation 864/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 161) 48, 60 (EC) (showing
that the initial SPS legislation was amended in 2004 to base the preceding
subsidies reference period for olive farmers on the four “marketing years” of
1999–2000, 2000–01, 2001–02, and 2002–03, instead of the original 2000–03
period for all farmers); see also Preliminary Countervailing Memo, supra note 34,
at 22 (indicating that farmers growing olives for oil received a subsidy rate per
hectare of 132.25/100kg and farmers growing olives for eating (i.e., table olives)
received a rate per hectare that was equal to 11.5% of the olive oil rate, which
equates to 15.2/100kg); Royal Decree Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment
Scheme Entitlements of the Common Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14 (implementing
the BPS in Spain).
37. Preliminary Countervailing Memo, supra note 34, at 25.
38. See Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
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C. THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITY NEED ONLY ADHERE TO THE
REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
FOR ITS ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES TO NOT BE FOUND WTOINCONSISTENT ON THE BASIS OF THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITY’S
INJURY DETERMINATION.
Article 3 of the ADA provides the parameters an investigating
authority must adhere to in its assessment of whether dumped
imports caused injury to the domestic industry.39 The ADA does not
require the investigating authority to use a specific methodology in
determining whether the dumped goods injured domestic producers;
the investigator need only adhere to the requirements of Article 3.40
Article 3 is divided into eight parts, and the relevant parts for the
injury determination in this case are 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5.41 Article
3.1 sets the tone for the investigating authority’s analyses under
sections 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5: “A determination of injury for purposes of
Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and
involve an objective examination. . . .”42
The first step of Article 3.2 requires a consideration of the volume
of dumped imports, specifically, “whether there has been a
significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or
relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.” 43
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1075)
(Spain) (defining agricultural activity as: “production, rearing[,] or agricultural
product cultivation, including harvesting, milking, animal husbandry, keeping of
animals for agricultural purposes[,] or maintenance of an agricultural area in a
suitable state for pasture or cultivation, without any preparatory measure beyond
the methods and agricultural machinery normally employed.”).
39. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.
40. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.141.
41. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.
42. Id. art. 3.1; see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶¶ 192–93, WTO
Doc. WT/DS184/AB/R (adopted July 24, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, United States – Hot-Rolled Steel] (explaining that all evidence examined
under the successive articles, 3.2–3.5, must be positive, meaning that it is
affirmative, objective, verifiable, and credible).
43. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.2; see Panel Report, China – Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of
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For example, in China – Cellulose Pulp, the panel upheld the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s (MOFCOM) volume analysis in
which MOFCOM found the increase in volume to be significant for
both absolute volume of dumped cellulose pulp (up 43.82%) and its
market share (up by 1.31 percentage-points), even though MOFCOM
never expressly labeled the increases as “significant.”44 Similarly, the
panel in Guatemala – Cement II sustained Guatemala’s finding of a
significant absolute increase in dumped cement imports from 140
tons to 25,079 tons, and a significant relative increase as a part of
domestic consumption from 1% to 21%, even though Guatemala
looked at only a one-year period.45 In addition, in Thailand – HBeams, the panel affirmed Thailand’s determination that the volume
of dumped H-beams from Poland increased significantly, from 48%
to 57%, relative to all other imports of H-beams.46
The second step of Article 3.2 requires an investigation of price
effects by the dumped goods.47 Price effects occur when “there has
been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports . . . or
[when] the [dumped imports] depress [domestic like good] prices to
a significant degree or prevent [domestic like good] price increases,
which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.”48
When an investigating authority alleges that there is price
undercutting, it needs to compare the price of the subject import with
Cellulose Pulp from Canada, ¶ 7.39, WTO Doc. WT/DS483/R (adopted May 23,
2017) [hereinafter Panel Report, China – Cellulose Pulp] (stating that the
investigating authority may rely on any one of the three volume analyses under
Article 3.2).
44. Panel Report, China – Cellulose Pulp, supra note 43, ¶¶ 7.46–7.48.
45. Panel Report, Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey
Portland Cement from Mexico, ¶¶ 8.262–8.266, WTO Doc. WT/DS156/R (adopted
Oct. 24, 2000).
46. Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes, and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, ¶¶ 7.164–7.172,
WTO Doc. WT/DS122/R (adopted Sept. 28, 2000) (noting that contextualizing the
data relative to other imports of the like good implicitly indicated the significance
of the Polish imports’ volume increase).
47. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.2.
48. Id.; see Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶
5.155–5.161 (determining that a finding of significant price undercutting does not
have to be found, only that it resulted in domestic price decreases or prevented
increases).
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the price of the domestic good, which will contextualize the price
relationship between the two goods and thereby demonstrate the
extent to which the subject import was priced lower than the
domestic good.49 As an example of an improper finding of price
undercutting, in China – HP-SSST, MOFCOM found significant
undercutting of HP-SSST Grades B and C compared to domestic HPSSST, but MOFCOM did not compare the price difference between
the subject imports and domestic goods, particularly between
dumped Grades B and C, and Grade A that comprised most of the
domestic industry output.50 Regardless of which price effect the
investigating authority is examining, it is permitted to look at more
than just the difference in price to determine what the price effects of
the dumped import is.51 For example, though the panel in China –
Cellulose Pulp quashed MOFCOM’s conclusion that parallel price
movements between the subject and like goods were a contributing
factor to decreasing prices of the like good over the POI, it did not
invalidate the other factors China used to make its price effects
determination that the subject imports depressed the price of the
domestic pulp.52 The other factors indicating price effects that
MOFCOM examined were: 1) price competition between subject and
domestic pulp, 2) a 43% increase in the volume of dumped pulp, 3) a
decline in domestic pulp prices, 4) pricing documents and meeting
minutes, and 5) significant dumping margins.53
49. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.161.
50. Id. ¶¶ 5.161, 5.163–5.164 (noting that whether the price undercutting is
significant depends on the facts of the case, and the investigating authority may
base its determination on all the positive evidence it has, including the size and
duration of the price undercutting, the type and nature of the goods at issue, and the
goods’ market share).
51. See Panel Report, China – Cellulose Pulp, supra note 43, ¶¶ 7.69–7.72,
7.109–7.112 (detailing the aspects examined by MOFCOM); see also Appellate
Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.161 (listing elements which an
investigating authority may consider with regard to price undercutting).
52. See Panel Report, China – Cellulose Pulp, supra note 43, ¶¶ 7.69–7.72,
7.109–7.112, n. 122 (“It seems clear that the greater the effect of dumped imports
in terms of price undercutting, price depression, or price suppression, the greater
the likely impact of those dumped imports with respect to factors such as lost sales
and market share and consequent financial effects such as deteriorating company
profits and profitability, as well as on factors such as inventories, production
capacity, and so on.”).
53. Id. ¶ 7.109.
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Article 3.4 requires an investigating authority to examine “the
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry . . . including
an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a
bearing on the state of the industry.”54 The relevant economic factors
and indices enumerated in Article 3.4 are required to be evaluated,
though the list is not exhaustive and no one factor or combination of
factors is dispositive.55 The investigating authority must determine
the “importance and weight” to be ascribed to each of the relevant
factors; this determination is based on the “bearing” each relevant
factor has “on the state of the domestic industry.”56 In China – HPSSST, MOFCOM’s 3.4 analysis was invalid because MOFCOM only
asserted that the dumping margins being greater than de minimis
resulted in impact to the domestic industry; MOFCOM did not
discuss the bearing the dumping margins had on the domestic
industry.57
For its Article 3.4 impact analysis, an investigating authority can
ascertain the state of the domestic industry by looking separately at
the market segments that compose that industry. 58 However, the
primary goal is for the investigating authority to ascertain the
54. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.4.
55. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5.202–
5.203 (listing relevant economic factors); Agreement on the Implementation of
Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8, art. 3.4 (“[A]ctual and potential decline in
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or
utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the
margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments.”); Appellate
Body Report, United States – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 42, ¶ 194.
56. Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.207.
57. Id. ¶¶ 5.208–5.212 (holding that China failed its Article 3.4 obligations
because MOFCOM’s analysis did “not assess in any way the relevance of the
margins of dumping . . . or indicate what weight it attributed to the margins of
dumping”).
58. See id. ¶ 5.204 (holding that evaluating the state of a domestic industry by
examining its various sectors is permissible under Article 3.4, and may help paint
an economic picture of the whole domestic industry); see also Appellate Body
Report, United States – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 42, ¶¶ 198–99 (considering
whether the US could direct the ITC to examine the structure of a domestic
industry and the importance of certain segments, which did not compete with the
subject goods, to the whole industry, the Appellate Body found nothing prohibiting
this in the ADA).
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relationship between the dumped goods and the economic
performance of the whole domestic industry, not just of individual
sectors.59 For example, in US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the US contravened
Article 3.4 by analyzing the whole domestic hot-rolled steel market
and the sector of the market that competed with the dumped goods,
but not analyzing the segment that did not compete with the dumped
goods.60
The relationship between the prices of the subject goods and the
domestic goods analyzed under Article 3.2 can be used in the 3.4
analysis of the impact of the dumped goods.61 In China – HP-SSST,
MOFCOM’s 3.4 analysis failed to use its 3.2 findings of price
undercutting of HP-SSST Grades B and C to evaluate the state of the
domestic industry, both segmented by grade and as a whole.62 Even if
the 3.2 analysis did not indicate there were price effects due to
dumped goods in all segments of the domestic industry, as was the
case with HP-SSST Grade A, the investigating authority should still
apply the 3.2 results to the whole domestic industry in the 3.4
analysis.63
Under Article 3.5, the investigating authority must demonstrate
“that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set
forth in [Articles 3.2 and 3.4], causing injury within the meaning of
this Agreement.”64 First, the investigating authority’s report
containing the injury determination must expressly discuss the nature
59. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.204
(highlighting the need to assess the industry as a whole); Appellate Body Report,
United States – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 42, ¶¶ 190, 204.
60. Appellate Body Report, United States – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 42, ¶¶
211–13.
61. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, ¶ 5.209 (allowing that the
results of the 3.2 analysis can inform the market share and domestic price factor
analyses under 3.4).
62. Id. ¶¶ 5.206–5.221.
63. See id. ¶¶ 5.206–5.212 (“Depending on the particular circumstances of each
case, an investigating authority may therefore be required to take into account, as
appropriate, the relative market shares of product types with respect to which it has
made a finding of price undercutting; and, for example, the duration and extent of
price undercutting, price depression or price suppression, that it has found to
exist.”).
64. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.5.

666

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:3

and scope of the injury for the anti-dumping duties to be upheld at
the WTO.65 In China – HP-SSST, MOFCOM never explained in its
determination report whether HP-SSST Grades B and C, the dumped
grades, were substitutable with Grade A, the grade that primarily
composed domestic HP-SSST production.66 MOFCOM’s failure to
determine whether Grades B and C were substitutable with Grade A
deprived MOFCOM of the positive evidence it needed to find injury
because an investigating authority must base its injury determination
on positive evidence and an objective examination.67 Additionally in
China – HP-SSST, the panel questioned MOFCOM’s objectivity
because MOFCOM’s Article 3.5 analysis did not consider the
changes in the dumped goods’ market share over the POI;
MOFCOM merely found injury on the basis that the market share of
the dumped goods over the POI was, in its view, high.68
Finally, under Article 3.5, the investigating authority must
“examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at
the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries
caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped
imports.”69 The other factors injuring the domestic industry must be
separated and distinguished from the injury caused by the dumped
imports.70 In US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the ITC looked at two other
factors that were injuring the domestic industry: increased production
capacity and increased intra-industry competition.71 The US found
65. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, ¶ 5.276 (finding no error in
the Panel’s decision to question the lack of examination or analysis of the nature or
scope of the injury).
66. Id. ¶¶ 5.259, 5.263.
67. Id.; see Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT,
supra note 8, art. 3.1 (“A determination of injury . . . shall be based on positive
evidence . . . “).
68. Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5.215–5.216.
69. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.5.
70. See Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, ¶
151, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/AB/R (adopted Oct. 18, 2012) (requiring the
separation and distinguishing of injurious effects from dumped imports and from
other factors).
71. Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain HotRolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶¶ 7.240–7.241, WTO Doc. WT/DS184/R
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increased production capacity was offset proportionally by increased
consumption over the POI, and the increased intra-industry
competition throughout the POI did not stop the industry from
performing well in one of the years of the POI; therefore, neither
factor fully explained the performance declines over the POI.72
It is essential for ruling out the other factors that the investigating
authority, earlier in its Article 3.5 injury analysis, thoroughly
explains the injury it found.73 In China – HP-SSST, MOFCOM
examined the decline in apparent consumption and the increase in
domestic production capacity as two factors other than the subject
goods that were injuring the domestic industry.74 Though MOFCOM
found that the decrease in price of HP-SSST Grade A could only be
explained by dumped Grades B and C, the WTO panel held this
finding invalid because MOFCOM did not earlier explain how
dumped Grades B and C injured an industry primarily producing
Grade A.75
The foregoing cases illustrate the application of Article 3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. The investigating authority’s injury
determination will not be found to be inconsistent with the WTO
Agreements if the investigator met the requirements of Article 3,
outlined above.76

D. A SUBSIDY IS DE JURE SPECIFIC UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON
SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ARTICLE 2.1(A)-(B)
IF ACCESS TO THE SUBSIDY IS LIMITED TO “CERTAIN ENTERPRISES.”
In its request for establishment of a Dispute Settlement Body
panel, the EU alleged the US contravened SCM Article 2.1(a)-(b) by
(adopted Feb. 28, 2001).
72. See id.
73. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.258
(“Rather, it is the task of a panel to examine whether the investigating authority
has adequately performed its investigative function . . . “).
74. Id. ¶ 5.285.
75. Panel Report, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on HighPerformance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubing (“HP-SSST”) from Japan, ¶ 7.203,
WTO Doc. WT/DS454/R (adopted Feb. 13, 2015).
76. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.14
(finding that the investigation does not have to follow a specific methodology or
template, so long as it follows Article 3).
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finding that BPS and Greening were de jure specific subsidies. 77 A
subsidy cannot be countervailed if it is not specific under SCM
Article 2.1; that is, whether access to the subsidy is limited to certain
enterprises in law or in fact.78 De jure specificity exists under Article
2.1(a) “[w]here the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to
which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a
subsidy to certain enterprises. . . .”79 However, under 2.1(b), if the
subsidy eligibility criteria are “clearly spelled out in law, regulation,
or other official document” and “are neutral, . . . do not favour [sic]
certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and
horizontal in application, such as number of employees or size of
enterprise,” de jure specificity shall not exist.80
A subsidy is de jure specific if its use is expressly limited to
certain enterprises, meaning it is not broadly available.81 WTO
Dispute Settlement Body panels and the Appellate Body have
repeatedly stated that what constitutes “certain enterprises” depends

77. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union, supra
note 6, at 1; cf. Preliminary Countervailing Memo, supra note 34, at 24, 26; First
Written Submission of the United States of America, United States – AntiDumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from Spain, ¶¶ 28–29, WTO
Doc.
WT/DS577
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.Sub1.fin_4.pdf (“[P]ositive
record evidence supported the USDOC’s determination that eligibility for subsidies
conferred under the BPS Programs was explicitly limited to certain enterprises or
industries . . . “).
78. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures arts. 2.1, 8.1(a),
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14.
79. Id. art. 2.1(a).
80. Id., art. 2.1(a) – (c), n.2 (adding that if not de jure specific, a subsidy can
still be be de facto specific based on other factors such as “use of a subsidy
programme [sic] by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by
certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to
certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the
granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.”).
81. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶ 373, WTO Doc.
WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report,
United States – AD/CVD (China)] (finding that Article 2.1(a) focuses on whether
access to the subsidy is limited, not whether the certain enterprises received the
subsidy).

2021]

THE OLIVES OF OTHERS

669

on the facts of each case.82 In US – Upland Cotton, the panel held the
contested subsidies to be limited to certain enterprises because the
“user marketing payments” were expressly dependent on the use or
export of Upland Cotton, and the other subsidies were expressly
limited to a small basket of agricultural goods, including Upland
Cotton.83 In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China),
China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan named certain projects to promote
economically, one of which was advanced radial tires, and other
projects to exclude.84 The panel held the preferential loans off-theroad tire manufacturers received from state-owned commercial banks
to be specific subsidies because the Five-Year Plan documents
enumerated which projects to support and which to exclude, many
from within the same parts of the economy, such as the chemicals
sector.85
Similarly, in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), the panel
found specificity of tax credits for computer programs used in the
design and development of commercial airplanes, and preproduction
development and property tax credits for manufacturers of airplanes
or their components.86 The implementing legislation expressly made
the tax credits available to businesses in the aerospace industry, and
viewing the implementing legislation in the context of the entire state
tax code did not negate the specificity; the aerospace tax credits were
not one part of a broadly available subsidy implemented piecemeal. 87
Conversely, in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), the panel
found payments made to Boeing under Commerce’s Advanced
82. See, e.g., id.; Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 7.1236, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/R
[hereinafter Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft]; Panel Report, United States
– Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 7.1142, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/R (adopted Sept.
8, 2004) [hereinafter Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton].
83. Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.1121, 7.1147–
7.1148.
84. Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), ¶¶
9.56–9.71, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (adopted Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Panel
Report, US – AD/CVD (China)] (explaining that off-the-road tires are a type of
advanced radial tire).
85. Id. ¶¶ 9.61–9.71, 9.96–9.105.
86. Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.195, 7.210–
7.211.
87. Id. ¶¶ 7.195–7.211.
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Technology Program to not be specific.88 The express limit of the
program to “high risk, high pay-off, emerging and enabling
technologies” did not facially “operate[] as a significant limitation”
to certain enterprises.89 The same panel made a similar finding for
another subsidy: the Triad Grant made via the High Growth Job
Training Initiative was not specific because while the Triad Grant
was targeted to the aerospace industry, it was just one of the
industries falling under the program’s broad “high growth industries
and economic sectors” express access limitation.90
Article 2.1(b) is the other half of the de jure specificity analysis
when the documents promulgating the subsidy outline criteria for
eligibility.91 Specificity shall not exist when the eligibility is
automatic, and the criteria are objective, “strictly adhered to,” and
enumerated in an official document.92 For example, in China –
GOES, the panel found that a subsidy to a GOES producer that
sponsored a retiree healthcare plan was not specific because the
eligibility criteria were objective: 1) the recipient must be a sponsor
of a retiree healthcare plan, and 2) the retiree healthcare plan must
include a qualified prescription drug benefit.93 Similarly, in United
States – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), the Appellate Body
found the eligibility criterion for the Washington State tax credit to
88. Id. ¶¶ 7.1228, 7.1255.
89. Id. ¶ 7.1242.
90. Id. ¶¶ 7.1367–7.1375.
91. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78, art.
2.1(b); see Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures
on Certain Products from China, ¶¶ 4.119–4.120, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R
(adopted Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on Certain Products
from China] (noting that a finding of de jure specificity under 2.1(b) can be an
alternative to finding de jure specificity under 2.1(a) if there is no explicit
limitation of access to subsidy, but there are criteria for eligibility); Appellate Body
Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), ¶ 754, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2012)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report on Large Civil Aircraft] (finding that, after
analysis under Article 2.1(a), a panel must also consider whether 2.1(b) or 2.1(c)
are applicable).
92. See Appellate Body Report, United States – AD/CVD (China), supra note
81, ¶ 367.
93. Panel Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain
Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, ¶¶ 7.64–7.65, WTO
Doc. WT/DS414/R (adopted June 15, 2012).
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not be objective because recipients had to be “engaged in activities
of commercial aircraft or component manufacturers.”94
The two foregoing fact patterns are the only examples in WTO
jurisprudence where the panel or Appellate Body directly analyzed
eligibility criteria under Article 2.1(b). However, there are two
additional instances in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint) in
which the panel noted eligibility criteria as objective, but did not do
so directly under 2.1(b).95 First, the eligibility criteria under
Commerce’s Advanced Technology Program used broad verbiage to
describe what would qualify for the subsidy, such as “highly
innovative” technology, “challenging” research, aims to “overcome
an important problem(s),” and significant potential contributions to
the “US scientific and technical knowledge base.”96 Second, the
eligibility criteria for the High Growth Job Training Initiative were
similarly broad: it was available to “business or business-related
nonprofit[s],” “education and training providers,” “economic
development agencies,” and entities that “administer[ed] the
workforce investment system.”97
A subsidy can only be countervailed if it is specific under SCM
Article 2.1, meaning access to the subsidy is limited to certain
enterprises.98 Because, in the US – Ripe Olives from Spain dispute,
Commerce found BPS and Greening to be de jure specific under
SCM Articles 2.1(a) and 2.1(b), a finding the EU contends, whether
the WTO will find the countervailing duties consistent with the US’
WTO obligations turns on the issue of specificity.99

III.

ANALYSIS

This Part first argues that the US was not in violation of Article 3
94. Appellate Body Report on Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 91, ¶ 857
(analyzing, sua sponte, the subsidy under Article 2.1(b) and noting that the
criterion was not objective because it favored certain enterprises over others).
95. Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.1243, 7.1367–
7.1369.
96. Id. ¶ 7.1243 (quoting § 295.6 of the ATP rules).
97. Id. ¶¶ 7.1367–7.1369 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2916a(3)).
98. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78, arts.
2.1, 8.1(a).
99. See Preliminary Countervailing Memo, supra note 34, at 24, 26.
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of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because its anti-dumping injury
determination met all of the Article’s requirements. This Part then
argues that Commerce erroneously found de jure specificity in
Spain’s implementing legislation for the Basic Payment Scheme and
Greening and that Commerce misconstrued what “access” to a
subsidy means in making its de jure specificity finding.

A. BECAUSE THE ITC FULLY CONSIDERED ALL THE FACTORS
REQUIRED BY ADA ARTICLE 3 IN MAKING ITS INJURY
DETERMINATION, A WTO PANEL WILL NOT QUESTION THE INJURY
DETERMINATION AND ON THOSE GROUNDS, IT WILL NOT FIND THE
ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON RIPE OLIVES FROM SPAIN TO BE
INCONSISTENT WITH THE WTO AGREEMENTS.
i. As required by ADA Article 3.2, the ITC’s analysis fully
considered volume and price effects of the subject goods within the
context of the domestic market over the POI.
The ADA does not require the investigating authority to use a
specific methodology, calculation, or bright-line rule in determining
whether the dumped goods injured domestic producers; the
investigator need only adhere to the procedural requirements of
Article 3.100 The first step of Article 3.2 requires a consideration of
the volume of dumped imports, specifically, “whether there has been
a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or
relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.” 101
In accordance with Article 3.2 of the ADA, the United States fully
considered whether there had been a significant increase in volume
of dumped ripe olives over the POI, concluding that despite a
decrease in overall import volume, there had been a significant
increase of imports in the retailer market segment relative to the
decrease in US producers’ shipments to retailers.102 Like in China –
100. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.141.
101. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.2; see Panel Report, China – Cellulose Pulp, supra note 43, ¶ 7.39 (holding
that the investigating authority may rely on any one of the three volume analyses
under Article 3.2).
102. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 18–19 (choosing not to discuss a
bright-line threshold for when volume increase becomes significant); cf.
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Cellulose Pulp in which MOFCOM looked at the change in absolute
volume of the dumped cellulose pulp from 421,000 to 605,500
metric tons over the POI and the 1.31-point market share increase,
Commerce considered absolute and relative volume and found an
overall decrease from 35,037 short tons to 32,782 short tons of total
subject goods imported, but an increase in volume of dumped olives
in the retail segment by 135.7% over the POI.103 The panel in
Guatemala – Cement II similarly did not find inconsistent
Guatemala’s determination that the absolute increase of dumped
cement from 140 tons to 25,079 tons, and the relative increase as a
part of domestic consumption from 1% to 21%, were significant. 104
In addition, the ITC’s finding that the volume of dumped olives to
US retailers increased significantly from 7.3% to 17% is a similar
contextualization to that which was upheld in Thailand – H-Beams,
in which Thailand found a significant increase in the volume of Hbeams from Poland, from 48% to 57%, relative to other imports of
H-beams.105
The second step of Article 3.2 required the ITC to examine three
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8, art. 3.2
(suggesting that the investigating authority should consider whether there was a
significant increase in volume of dumped imports by looking at absolute volume,
volume relative to domestic production, or volume relative to domestic
consumption); Panel Report, China – Cellulose Pulp, supra note 43, ¶ 7.39 (noting
that the investigating authority need only use one of the three volume analyses
under Article 3.2).
103. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 15, 18–19, IV-14, n.105 (finding that
despite the changes in volume, a plurality of importers and purchasers (e.g.,
retailers) reported that US demand for ripe olives did not change over the POI,
despite a decrease in apparent consumption of ripe olives in the US); see also
Panel Report, supra note 43, ¶¶ 7.46–7.48 (upholding that MOFCOM considered
whether the increase in volume was significant even though MOFCOM never
expressly labeled its finding of a 43.82% absolute volume increase and 1.31
percentage-point market share increase as “significant” increases).
104. Panel Report, supra note 45, ¶¶ 8.262–8.266 (holding the significant
increase finding as valid even though Guatemala examined only a single year of
imports of the subject good, from June 1995 to May 1996).
105. See Panel Report, supra note 46, ¶¶ 7.164–7.172 (noting that
contextualizing the data relative to other, non-subject imports of the good
implicitly indicated the significance of the Polish imports’ volume increase); ITC
Investigations, supra note 10, at IV-14, n.105 (finding a 135% increase compared
to the 6.4% decrease in short tons imported from Spain during the same period,
2015–17).
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price effects: “[1] whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the dumped imports . . . [2] whether the [dumped
imports] depress [domestic like good] prices to a significant degree
or [3] prevent [domestic like good] price increases, which otherwise
would have occurred, to a significant degree.”106 The ITC’s price
effects analysis was thorough and complied with Article 3.2; it first
considered price undercutting and contextualized the undercutting
within the domestic market.107 Unlike China – HP-SSST, in which
MOFCOM found significant price undercutting based only on the
magnitude of undercutting in 2010, a non-contextual analysis that did
not examine change over time, the ITC looked at the price difference
between the imported and domestic ripe olives over three full
years.108 Ripe olives from Spain, in thirty-seven out of forty-eight
quarterly price comparisons, undersold US-produced ripe olives,
averaging 30.3% below in price throughout the three-year POI.109
The ITC’s Article 3.2 undercutting analysis was also thorough
because it did not need to analyze the price undercutting on a pergrade basis.110 In China – HP-SSST, when MOFCOM determined
there was significant price undercutting by imports of Grades B and
C HP-SSST, MOFCOM did not consider the relative market shares
between grades of HP-SSST sold in China, and whether the relative
market shares caused dumped Grades B and C to also undercut
domestic Grade A.111 The ITC considered the different grades of ripe
106. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.2; see Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5.155–
5.161 (establishing that investigating authorities do not have to find that significant
price undercutting resulted in domestic price decreases or prevented increases, but
they still must examine whether the latter two resulted).
107. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 20–21.
108. Compare Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶
5.163–5.164 with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 20–21.
109. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 20–21.
110. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 17, I-10–I-11, II-11–II-12 (discussing
the grades and substitutability of ripe olives and finding dumped and domestic ripe
olives highly substitutable); see Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra
note 18, ¶ 5.262 (“[A]nalysis of ‘substitutability’ . . . may well be required in
cases . . . involving a dumped product and a like domestic product consisting of a
range of different product types that are distinguished by considerable price
differences. . . .”).
111. Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5.163–5.164
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olives in its substitutability analysis because quality is a condition
affecting whether goods are interchangeable; it found that the quality
of the Spanish and American ripe olives provided a high degree of
substitutability.112 Unlike the different grades of HP-SSST, the
substitutability of which China never addressed in its injury
determination, the ITC’s finding of high substitutability allowed the
ITC to compare imported and domestic prices for undercutting
without segmenting them by grade.113
Not only did the ITC contextualize Article 3.2 price undercutting
by analyzing the price difference over the POI and the
substitutability of the dumped and domestic olives, but it also
contextualized the price undercutting with its effects on market
share.114 Similar to China – Cellulose Pulp, in which the panel did
not invalidate MOFCOM’s consideration of non-price factors
contributing to price undercutting, such as the 43% increase in
volume of dumped pulp and information in meeting minutes of
Chinese pulp producers showing they were forced to decrease their
prices due to competition from lower-priced Canadian pulp, the ITC
considered the 7.3% to 17% increase in captured retailer market
share by the dumped olives as an effect of the price undercutting by
dumped olives.115
(holding that China’s analysis was inconsistent with Article 3.2 by not considering
these market shares, nor the differences in price between each domestically
produced grade, both of which are relevant evidence to a price undercutting
analysis).
112. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 17, I-10–I-11, II-11–II-12 (choosing
not to explicitly compare prices of different grades).
113. Compare Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.262
with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 17, I-10–I-11, II-11–II-12 (discussing
the grades and substitutability of ripe olives, finding dumped and domestic ripe
olives highly substitutable).
114. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 20–21 (“[S]everal factors support our
finding of significant underselling including: . . . (4) the underselling by subject
imports which enabled them to capture market share from domestic industry in the
important retail sector. . . .”).
115. Compare Panel Report, supra note 43, ¶¶ 7.58, 7.109 (invalidating
MOFCOM’s price effects analysis solely on the basis that parallel pricing factor
did not work because the price of the dumped good was higher than the domestic
good) and id. n.122 ( It seems clear that the greater the effect of dumped imports
in terms of price undercutting, price depression, or price suppression, the greater
the likely impact of those dumped imports with respect to factors such as lost sales
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After finding there was significant price undercutting, the ITC
looked at the remaining two price effects, as required by Article
3.2.116 During the POI there were no significant changes in the price
of domestically produced ripe olives due to the imported ripe olives
from Spain, either 1) significantly depressing prices, or 2) preventing
price increases that would have otherwise occurred.117 By
considering the remaining two types of price effects, and seeing
whether either had occurred, the ITC completed its price effects
analysis required under ADA Article 3.2.118
ii. The ITC fulfilled the requirements of Article 3.4 by considering
all the indicia relevant to the state of the domestic ripe olive industry
to determine the impact of the imported olives on the domestic
industry.
Article 3.4 required the ITC to examine “the impact of the dumped
imports on the domestic industry . . . including an evaluation of all
relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state
of the industry.”119 In its impact analysis, the ITC examined all the
factors required by Article 3.4 and noted those bearing greater

and market share. . . .”) with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 20–21, n.105
( [S]everal factors support our finding of significant underselling including: (1) the
predominant underselling by subject imports on a per instance and volume basis;
(2) the high degree of substitutability between the domestic like product and
subject imports; (3) the importance of price in purchasing decisions; (4) the
underselling by subject imports which enabled them to capture market share from
domestic industry in the important retail sector; and (5) the reports of lost sales.”).
116. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra
note 8, art. 3; Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5.155–
5.161 (explaining that the investigating authority does not have to find that
significant price undercutting resulted in domestic prices decreases or prevented
increases, but it still must examine whether the latter two resulted).
117. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 21–22 (noting that prices of domestic
ripe olives increased during the POI).
118. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra
note 8, art. 3; Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5.155–
5.161 (explaining that the investigating authority does not have to find that
significant price undercutting resulted in domestic prices decreases or prevented
increases, but it still must examine whether the latter two resulted).
119. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.4.
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impact on the domestic industry’s health.120 Unlike MOFCOM in
China – HP-SSST, which claimed that the domestic industry was
impacted by the dumping margins that were greater than de minimis,
but did not discuss the importance of this metric on the domestic
industry, the ITC noted that several factors had greater bearing than
others.121 Unlike MOFCOM’s 3.4 analysis, the ITC noted the greater
bearing of the retailer distribution channel because it was the most
important market segment to domestic ripe olive producers, the
retailer channel lost market share to the subject imports, and
producers held increased inventories.122 The bearing that the ITC
ascribed to the retailer market segment is supportable because unlike
US – Hot-Rolled Steel, in which the US examined only one market
segment but not the other, the ITC also looked at the ripe olives
distributors and institutional segments.123
The ITC further examined factors having a bearing on the
domestic industry by applying its Article 3.2 underselling findings to
the Article 3.4 impact analysis.124 Dissimilar to MOFCOM in China
– HP-SSST, which did not use its 3.2 findings to evaluate the impact
of the dumped goods on the domestic industry, the ITC related the
120. See id. (“[A]ctual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market
share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors
affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and
potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth,
ability to raise capital or investments.”); ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 22–
24 (examining production capacity, production volume, capacity utilization, US
shipments by quantity, inventories, number of production and related workers
(PRWs), total hours worked, hours worked per PRW, wages paid, hourly wages,
worker productivity, net income, operating income, net income and operating
income ratioed to net sales, capital expenditures, research and development
expenses, total net assets, and operating return on assets).
121. Compare Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶
5.208–5.212 (holding that China did not meet its obligations under Article 3.4
because it did not discuss the bearing of the indicators of health of the domestic
industry) with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24.
122. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24.
123. Compare Appellate Body Report, United States – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra
note 42, ¶¶ 211–13 (finding the analysis inconsistent with the Agreement because
the ITC did not examine the hot-rolled steel market segment that did not compete
with the dumped imports) with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24, II-2
(discovering that, while the retailers segment was not the largest domestic market
segment, it was the market segment that domestic producers primarily sold to).
124. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24.
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significant volume and underselling of ripe olives to the loss of
market share in the retailer distribution channel and the resultant
changes of the industry’s economic indicators.125 The Appellate Body
in China – HP-SSST also noted that MOFCOM should have applied
its Article 3.2 findings to its impact analysis to both per segment and
to the whole market, especially because only Grades B and C were
dumped, but domestic producers primarily made Grade A.126 Unlike
MOFCOM, the ITC discussed how the impact of the volume and
underselling of ripe olives on the retailer segment affected the whole
domestic industry because the retailer segment was the primary
recipient of domestically produced ripe olives.127
By examining indicia of the state of the domestic industry,
including those enumerated by Article 3.4, noting which indicia had
the greatest bearing on the health of the domestic industry, and by
also assessing the impact of the volume and price effects found in its
Article 3.2 analysis, the ITC fulfilled its obligations under Article
3.4.128
iii. The ITC fulfilled the requirements of Article 3.5 by expressly
stating the nature and scope of the injury caused by the subject
goods, and separating and distinguishing that injury from those
caused by concurrent injuring factors.
Under Article 3.5, the ITC needed to demonstrate “that the
dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in
[Article 3.2 and 3.4], causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement.”129 The ITC’s Article 3.5 analysis determined that ripe
125. Compare Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶
5.206–5.221, (holding that China did not meet its obligations under Art. 3.4
because it did not perform the required segmented impact analysis, which was
required based on the results of the Art. 3.2 analysis that showed there was
dumping and price undercutting on only two of the three grades of HP-SSST, and
the different grades of HP-SSST comprised different market shares and had
different prices) with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24.
126. Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5.206–5.212.
127. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24.
128. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra
note 8, art. 3.4; ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 22–24.
129. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.5.
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olives from Spain injured the domestic industry.130 First, the ITC’s
report containing the injury determination needed to expressly
discuss the nature and scope of the injury for the anti-dumping duties
to be upheld at the WTO.131 As noted by the Appellate Body in
China – HP-SSST, MOFCOM’s injury determination never expressly
discussed the nature and scope of the injury; MOFCOM merely said
there was injury because the dumping margin was large. 132 Unlike
MOFCOM’s injury determination in China – HP-SSST, which never
discussed how dumped Grades B and C injured a domestic industry
primarily producing Grade A, the ITC expressly said that the volume
and undercutting of the dumped olives captured market share in the
retailer segment, resulting in increased inventories and lost profits.133
China’s report never discussed whether Grades B and C were
substitutable with Grade A, which would have offered evidence of
potential injury, but conversely, the ITC noted that Spanish and
American ripe olives were highly substitutable and implied that the
only remaining major factor differentiating them was price.134
Second, not only did the ITC expressly identify the injury caused
by dumped imports, but the ITC’s injury determination under Article
3.5 comported with the objectivity and positive evidence
requirements of Article 3.1: “A determination of injury [under the
ADA] shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective
examination.”135 The market share that MOFCOM used in China –
HP-SSST to determine injury was based on the market share at only
one point during the POI, which the Appellate Body held to negate

130. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24.
131. See Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.276
(emphasizing the need for evidence of injury to the industry).
132. Id. ¶¶ 5.215–5.216, 5.249.
133. Compare id. ¶ 5.262 with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24.
134. Compare Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶
5.262–5.263 with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 17, II-12–II-14 ( The
degree of substitution between domestic and imported ripe olives depends upon
such factors as relative prices, quality [(i.e., grade)] . . . , and conditions of sale. . . .
Based on available data, [ITC] staff believes that there is high degree of
substitutability between domestically produced ripe olives and ripe olives imported
from Spain.”).
135. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.1; ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at IV-14.
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objectivity.136 Unlike MOFCOM, the ITC looked at the market share
of the dumped olives at multiple points in the POI as the volume sold
to the retailer channel increased from 2,231 short tons in 2015, to
3,679 in 2016, and 5,259 in 2017, comparing those figures to the
volumes distributed by US producers to the retail market segment.137
Third, the ITC completed its Article 3.5 analysis by ensuring that
it was not mistakenly attributing the injury to the dumped goods,
separating and distinguishing concurrent injuries from other
factors.138 In US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the ITC was able to eliminate the
two other injuring factors it identified: 1) increased production
capacity because it was proportional to increased consumption, and
2) increased intra-industry competition because in one of the years of
the POI, the whole industry performed well despite the intra-industry
competition.139 Similar to US – Hot-Rolled Steel, in which the other
factors did not fully explain the performance declines over the POI,
the ITC was able to eliminate the decrease in apparent consumption
and the third-country, non-subject imports of ripe olives.140 This
elimination was possible because the decline in apparent
consumption was smaller than the domestic producers’ declines in
shipments, net sales, and operating and net income; the non-subject
imports were also eliminated because they comprised a much smaller
market share than the subject goods, even though non-subject
136. Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5.215–5.216,
5.249 (“[W]hile an investigating authority might properly determine, given the
necessary facts, that high market shares exacerbate the price effects of dumped
imports, an objective and impartial investigating authority would also consider
whether the fact that import market shares are declining significantly indicates that
the price effects are in fact somewhat attenuated.”).
137. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at IV-14.
138. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24–26; see Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8, art. 3.5 ( Factors which
may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports
not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of
consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and
domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and
productivity of the domestic industry.”).
139. Panel Report, supra note 71, ¶¶ 7.240–7.241 (holding that the ITC properly
separated and distinguished injury from increased production capacity and intraindustry competition from injury caused by dumped hot-rolled steel from Japan).
140. Compare id. with ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 25–26.

2021]

THE OLIVES OF OTHERS

681

imports did also capture market share from domestic producers.141
The ITC facilitated its non-attribution injury analysis by clearly
explaining earlier in its Article 3.5 analysis the injury it found the
dumped ripe olives to have caused.142 In China – HP-SSST,
MOFCOM identified a decline in apparent consumption and an
increase in domestic production capacity as two factors that were
also injuring the domestic industry but never established how
dumped Grades B and C were injuring an industry that primarily
produced Grade A.143 The panel clarified that it was not possible to
separate and distinguish these other injuring factors if MOFCOM
had never clearly explained how the injury from the dumped goods
occurred.144 Unlike MOFCOM, the ITC stated that domestic ripe
olive producers were injured by subject imports because they
captured retailer market share, causing increased inventories and lost
profits.145
For the foregoing reasons, the ITC fully complied with the
requirements set out for an injury determination in Article 3 of the
ADA, and the anti-dumping duties will not be found to be WTOinconsistent based on the ITC’s injury determination.146

141. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 25–26.
142. Id. at 24.
143. Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST, supra note 18, ¶ 5.285; see
Panel Report, supra note 75, ¶ 7.203 (explaining how a failure to account for how
dumped Grades B and C affected domestic Grade A rendered the non-attribution
analysis moot).
144. Panel Report, supra note 75, ¶ 7.203 (declaring inadequacy in MOFCOM’s
injury finding due to the fact that the prices of Grades A, B, and C all fell at the
same rate).
145. ITC Investigations, supra note 10, at 24.
146. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 8,
art. 3.
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B. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INCORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT THE BASIC PAYMENT SCHEME AND GREENING WERE DE JURE
SPECIFIC SUBSIDIES UNDER ARTICLE 2.1 OF THE SCM; THEREFORE,
THE US’ COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON RIPE OLIVES ARE WTOINCONSISTENT.
i. BPS and Greening are not de jure specific subsidies under SCM
Article 2.1(a) because the language of the implementing legislation
restricting subsidy access to “agricultural activity” confers broad
availability.
BPS and Greening are not specific subsidies because access to
them is not limited to “certain enterprises,” as characterized in the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)
Article 2.1(a).147 There were two US Federal programs examined in
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint) that the WTO panel
found to not be specific subsidies.148 The panel considered that the
payments to Boeing from Commerce’s Advanced Technology
Program were broadly available.149 The express restriction in the
Advanced Technology Program was to “high risk, high pay-off,
emerging and enabling technologies,” which the panel held to not be
a significant limitation on access to the subsidy under Commerce’s
program.150 Elsewhere in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint),
147. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78, art.
2.1(a) (finding that de jure specificity exists under Article 2.1(a) [w]here the
granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority
operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises. . . .”); see
Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to Agriculture,
Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1075) (Spain)
(defining agricultural activity as production, rearing[,] or agricultural product
cultivation, including harvesting, milking, animal husbandry, keeping of animals
for agricultural purposes[,] or maintenance of an agricultural area in a suitable state
for pasture or cultivation, without any preparatory measure beyond the methods
and agricultural machinery normally employed.”); Royal Decree Concerning
Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common Agricultural
Policy §§ 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1076) (Spain) (making eligible all farmers owning
one or more hectares of land used for “agricultural activity”).
148. Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.1228, 7.1255,
7.1367–7.1375.
149. Id. ¶¶ 7.1228, 7.1255.
150. Id. ¶ 7.1242 (noting that, per the ATP Rules §§ 295.1(a)(3) and 287n(a),
limiting funding to emerging and enabling technologies makes the program
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the panel similarly found broad, restrictive language that granted
access to a payment, made under the Department of Labor’s High
Growth Job Training Initiative, to a community college that trained
Boeing employees.151 The restrictive language of the program limited
receipt to “high growth industries and economic sectors,” which
enabled a wide range of enterprises to receive program payments. 152
The broad availability of these two US Federal programs is similar to
BPS and Greening, which are available to farmers growing any kind
of crop or raising any kind of livestock.153
Typically, an express restriction creating a specific subsidy is
manifested by a cherry-picking of subindustries targeted for
government support, unlike BPS and Greening, which are available
to the whole Spanish agriculture industry.154 For example, in US –
Upland Cotton the subsidies were expressly dependent on the use or
export of Upland Cotton, or were expressly limited to a small group
of agricultural goods that included Upland Cotton; thus, they were
specific subsidies.155 Payments under BPS and Greening, on the other
hand, are available to any kind of farmer in Spain.156 In US – Antiavailable to a “wide breadth of potential application[s]” and the Commerce
Secretary “shall assure that the Program . . . avoids providing undue advantage to
specific companies”).
151. Id. ¶¶ 7.1367–7.1375 (finding that the Triad Grant was given to Edmonds
Community College specifically to train Boeing 787 workers).
152. Id. (listing other industries that received grants under the High Growth Job
Training Initiative including energy, financial services, healthcare, hospitality, and
retail).
153. See Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1075)
(Spain).
154. E.g., Panel Report, supra note 84, ¶¶ 9.61–9.71, 9.96–9.105 (finding an
express restriction when certain industries were allowed to participate while others
were not); Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.195, 7.210–
7.211.
155. Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.1121, 7.1147–
7.1148 (noting that the subsidies that benefitted upland cotton were: user
marketing (Step 2) payments to domestic users and exporters, marketing loan
program payments, production flexibility contract payments, market loss assistance
payments, direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, crop insurance subsidies,
cottonseed payments).
156. See Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14; Royal Decree
Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common
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Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), the WTO panel found
a subsidy conferred by China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan to be
specific because it named certain projects, such as advanced radial
tires, to promote economically and other projects to exclude, many
from within the same industries.157 The Five-Year Plan, by including
and excluding projects from within the same industries, created an
express restriction under which only certain enterprises could access
the preferential loans given out by state-owned commercial banks.158
This express restriction that created a specific subsidy is unlike the
BPS and Greening implementing legislation that conferred the
subsidy to all farmers and did not exclude certain types of
agricultural activity from accessing the subsidy.159
Also showing a cherry-picking of subindustries to support, thereby
resulting in specific subsidies, are the Washington State tax credits at
issue in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint).160 The
Washington State computer program tax credit was limited to
applications for the design and development of commercial
airplanes, and the preproduction and property tax credits were
similarly restricted to manufacturers of airplanes or their
components.161 All three of these Washington State tax credits
targeted the airline manufacturing subindustry within the broader
manufacturing industry, rendering them specific subsidies, which is
Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1076) (Spain).
157. Panel Report, supra note 84, ¶¶ 9.56–9.71 (finding that off-the-road tires
are a type of advanced radial tire, which was a specific project promoted in the
Five-Year Plan).
158. Id. ¶¶ 9.61–9.71, 9.96–9.105 (noting that Chinese commercial banking law
required commercial banks to consider the Chinese government’s macroeconomic
policies when making loans, and the government encouraged these banks to only
lend to industries or projects promoted in the government’s policies).
159. See Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14; Royal Decree
Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common
Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14.
160. Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.195, 7.210–
7.211.
161. Id. ¶¶ 7.195–7.211 (looking for links between tax credits such as the
timing of their introduction, their purpose[,] or in their levels,” which would
indicate the existence of a broadly available subsidy program, but the other tax
credits in the code were introduced at various times and for various purposes).
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dissimilar to BPS and Greening because the latter are not limited to
any particular agriculture subindustries.162
For the foregoing reasons, the language in the Spanish legislation
implementing BPS and Greening that expressly restricts the
availability of these two subsidies to any farmer in Spain does not
create a de jure specific subsidy under SCM Article 2.1(a). 163 With
BPS and Greening, there is not the cherry-picking of subindustries
that the WTO has found to constitute specific subsidies in other
disputes.164
ii. BPS and Greening are not de jure specific subsidies under SCM
Article 2.1(b) because eligibility based on owning land for
agricultural activity is an objective criterion.
BPS and Greening are also not de jure specific subsidies when
their eligibility criteria are reviewed for objectivity under SCM
Article 2.1(b), the other method for finding de jure specificity,
because eligibility based on owning land used for agricultural
activity does not favor subsidy access for some farmers over
others.165 In China – GOES, the panel found a subsidy to a GOES
producer was not de jure specific because the eligibility criteria were
162. Id. ¶¶ 7.195, 7.210 7.211.
163. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78,
art. 2.1(a); Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13 14; Royal Decree
Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common
Agricultural Policy §§ 13 14.
164. E.g., Panel Report, US – AD/CVD (China), supra note 84, ¶¶ 9.61 9.71,
9.96; Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.195, 7.210
7.211; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.1121, 7.1147
7.1148.
165. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78,
art. 2.1(b) ( Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the
granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions governing
the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist. . . . );
Appellate Body Report on Certain Products from China, supra note 91, ¶¶ 4.119
4.120 (noting that a finding of de jure specificity under Art. 2.1(b) can be an
alternative to finding de jure specificity under Art. 2.1(a) if there is no explicit
limitation of access to a subsidy, but there are criteria for eligibility); Appellate
Body Report on Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 91, ¶ 754 (stating that, following
analysis under Art. 2.1(a), a panel must also consider whether Arts. 2.1(b) or 2.1(c)
are applicable).
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objective: 1) the recipient must be a sponsor of a retiree healthcare
plan, and 2) the retiree healthcare plan must include a qualified
prescription drug benefit.166 This language in China – GOES is broad
and objective, similar to the criteria in the BPS and Greening
implementing legislation that permits anyone who owns land that is
used for “agricultural activity” to be eligible for BPS and
Greening.167 Conversely, the Washington business and occupation
tax credits’ eligibility criterion was “[engagement] in activities of
commercial aircraft or component manufactur[ing],” which the
Appellate Body deemed to not be objective because the criterion
significantly limited the availability of the subsidy to a discrete
group.168 This commercial aircraft or component manufacturing
eligibility criterion expressly excluded other types of recipients from
within the manufacturing industry, thereby limiting eligibility to a
single subindustry, unlike BPS and Greening, which made eligible
any landowning farmer in the agriculture industry.169
The US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint) panel made two
additional findings of objective eligibility criteria that are similar to
the BPS and Greening ownership of land for agricultural activity
criterion, but the panel did not do so under an express 2.1(b)
analysis.170 First, the eligibility criteria under Commerce’s Advanced
Technology Program used broad verbiage to describe what would
qualify for the subsidy, such as “highly innovative” technology,
“challenging” research, aims to “overcome an important
problem(s),” and significant potential contributions to the “US

166. Panel Report, supra note 93, ¶¶ 7.64–7.65.
167. See Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14; Royal Decree
Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common
Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14.
168. Appellate Body Report on Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 91, ¶ 857
(noting that the criterion was not objective because it favored certain enterprises
over others).
169. Compare id. with Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct
Payments to Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14 and Royal
Decree Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the
Common Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14.
170. Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82, ¶¶ 7.1243, 7.1367–
7.1369.
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scientific and technical knowledge base.”171 Second, the eligibility
criteria for the High Growth Job Training Initiative were similarly
broad: the subsidy was available to “business or business-related
nonprofit[s],” “education and training providers,” “economic
development agencies,” and entities that “administer[ed] the
workforce investment system.”172 Eligibility for these two US
Federal programs was objective and did not limit access to the
subsidies by favoring one or more subindustries over others, similar
to BPS and Greening not limiting eligibility to only certain
agriculture subindustries.173
For the foregoing reasons, the eligibility criterion in the Spanish
legislation implementing BPS and Greening, which confers
eligibility for these two subsidies to any landowner in Spain carrying
out agricultural activity, does not create a de jure specific subsidy
under SCM Article 2.1(b).174
iii. BPS’s and Greening’s historical ties to specific subsidies that
were coupled to olive production do not limit access to BPS and
Greening solely to olive farmers, and thus do not render them
specific subsidies.
Language in the implementing legislation for BPS and Greening
that based the subsidy rates off prior subsidy programs that had ties
to de jure specific subsidies from the 1990s does not restrict access to
BPS and Greening to certain enterprises.175 As the Appellate Body
described in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China),
171. Id. ¶ 7.1243 (quoting § 295.6 of the ATP rules).
172. Id. ¶¶ 7.1367–7.1369 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2916a(3)).
173. Compare id. with Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct
Payments to Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14 and Royal
Decree Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the
Common Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14.
174. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78,
art. 2.1(b); Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14; Royal Decree
Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common
Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14.
175. See Council Regulation 864/2004, supra note 36, at 60 (basing BPS’
predecessor on how the olive market was doing); Royal Decree Concerning
Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common Agricultural
Policy §§ 13–14 (setting the subsidy rates per hectare).
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SCM Article 2.1(a) and (b) focus on eligibility for a subsidy, which
means access to the subsidy.176 Merriam-Webster defines “access” as
the “freedom or ability to obtain or make use of something.”177
Commerce argued there was de jure specificity because BPS and
Greening subsidy rates have a historical basis in the Organization of
Markets in Fats and Oils, which was a specific subsidy coupled to
olive production.178 Even if the way subsidy rates were set under BPS
and Greening led to olive farmers receiving higher than average BPS
and Greening payments, as alleged by the US, the BPS and Greening
implementing legislation is the opposite of the Washington State tax
credits in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint) because olive
farmers are not the only farmers who can access BPS and
Greening.179 The tax credits for the aerospace industry were
implemented in individual pieces of legislation; the panel looked at
the individual legislation within the universe of Washington State tax
credits and found nothing to suggest the aerospace tax credits were
part of a more broadly available subsidy program, which would
render the aerospace tax credits non-specific subsidies.180 The
implementing legislation for BPS and Greening in Spain was just the
opposite: Spain did not implement BPS and Greening in separate
176. Appellate Body Report, United States – AD/CVD (China), supra note 81,
¶¶ 368, 372–73 (failing to define “access”).
177. Access,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/access (last accessed July 12, 2020).
178. Preliminary Countervailing Memo, supra note 34, at 24, 26 (“[B]ecause the
crop type determines the grant amounts provided under this program due to the
direct reliance on the grant amounts provided under previous programs, which
based grant amounts on the crop type. As such, the program is specific to olive
growers.”); see First Written Submission of the United States of America, supra
note 77, ¶¶ 28–29 (“[P]ositive record evidence supported the USDOC’s
determination that eligibility for subsidies conferred under the BPS Programs was
explicitly limited to certain enterprises or industries.”).
179. See Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82, ¶ 7.195
(finding that HB 2294, the implementing legislation for the disputed business and
occupation tax credits, contained express language indicating the reduced rates
were for businesses involved in airplane manufacturing or the supply chain).
180. Id. ¶¶ 7.195–7.211 (noting that if the aerospace tax credits were part of a
broadly available subsidy program in the Washington tax code, there would be
evidence of links between the subsidies comprising the program, such as “the
timing of their introduction, their purpose[,] or in their levels,” but the other tax
credits in the code were introduced at various times and for various purposes).
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legislation for each type of farmer; instead, BPS and Greening were
instituted for all Spanish farmers together.181 Every farmer in Spain
who owns land used for agricultural activity has the “freedom or
ability to obtain or make use of” BPS and Greening; no one’s access
is restricted because they do not farm olives.182
For the foregoing reasons, the implementing language of BPS and
Greening in Spain did not expressly limit subsidy access to “certain
enterprises,” nor did the “agricultural activity” eligibility criterion
limit access to “certain enterprises.”183 Therefore, BPS and Greening
are not de jure specific subsidies under Article 2.1(a)-(b) of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the US’
countervailing duties on ripe olives from Spain are WTOinconsistent.184

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This section makes three recommendations. First, the US should
rescind its countervailing duties because they are in violation of
Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. Second, Spain should accelerate the convergence of its
fifty agricultural regions used to assign entitlement rates, which will
align it with other EU member states, and remove the appearance of
non-objectivity in making Basic Payment Scheme and Greening
payments. Third, the WTO should develop and publish a clear test
that WTO members can use to determine whether a subsidy is
restricted to certain enterprises and is not broadly available, which
181. See Royal Decree Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme
Entitlements of the Common Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1076)
(Spain) (making eligible all farmers owning one or more hectares of land used for
“agricultural activity”).
182. Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1075)
(Spain); cf. Access, supra note 177.
183. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78,
art. 2.1(a)–(b); Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14; Royal Decree
Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common
Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14.
184. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78,
art. 2.1(a)–(b).
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could increase WTO dispute resolution efficiency.

A. THE US SHOULD RESCIND ITS COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON RIPE
OLIVES FROM SPAIN, BUT MAINTAIN THE ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES.
As a Member of the WTO, the US should not abuse its discretion
to implement trade remedies.185 The WTO’s Anti-Dumping and
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreements govern how
WTO Members respond to dumped and subsidized imports.186
However, it is the Member State’s choice to respond to dumped and
subsidized imports.187 Because whether the Member State responds is
at its discretion, the Member State should honor the privilege of
autonomy by not implementing frivolous trade remedies.
To honor this privilege, the US should rescind its countervailing
duties on ripe olives from Spain without the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body panel having to rule against the US. As discussed in
Section III of this Comment, one of the reasons the US found the
BPS and Greening subsidies to be countervailable with respect to
ripe olives was because it deemed BPS and Greening to be de jure
specific subsidies;188 that is, “the granting authority, or the legislation
pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits
access to a subsidy to certain enterprises.”189 Commerce’s finding of
185. See
Members
and
Observers,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last accessed
Nov. 6, 2020).
186. Understanding the WTO – Anti-Dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards:
Contingencies,
etc.,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last accessed
June 24, 2020) [hereinafter Understanding the WTO].
187. See id. (“[T]he WTO agreement allows governments to act against
dumping . . . “ (emphasis added)).
188. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., Issues and Decision
Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation
of Ripe Olives from Spain, 32–34 (June 11, 2018) (public document),
https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/spain/2018-12990-1.pdf
[hereinafter
Final Countervailing Memo] (“As we explained in the Preliminary Determination,
our finding of de jure specificity is based on the manner in which Spain
implemented [BPS and Greening] with reference to the operations of its two
predecessor programs, the Single Payment Scheme and the Common Organisation
[sic] of Markets in Oils and Fats . . . , and the manner in which the amount of
assistance was determined under these two programs.”).
189. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78, art.
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specificity hinged on a conflation of “access” to BPS and Greening
and the subsidy rate received by farmers under these programs. 190
Commerce’s conflation of access to a subsidy and the subsidy rate, in
finding specificity, contravened both the plain meaning of “access”
as well as the clarification of “limits access to a subsidy to certain
enterprises” by prior Dispute Settlement Body panels.191
The US’ finding of specificity based on conflation of terms and
the resultant implementation of countervailing duties is
unconscionable and not in the spirit of the discretion granted to WTO
members to implement countervailing duties within the confines of
the SCM.192 The US should preemptively rescind its countervailing
duties on ripe olives from Spain before the WTO panel renders its
decision.

B. SPAIN SHOULD ACCELERATE THE CONVERGENCE OF THE
SUBSIDY RATES OF ITS FIFTY AGRICULTURAL REGIONS TO
ELIMINATE HISTORICAL INFLUENCE ON RATES FROM PAST SUBSIDY
PROGRAMS THAT WERE COUPLED TO SPECIFIC AGRICULTURAL
OUTPUT.

Spain has far more BPS and Greening subsidy regions than other
EU Member States, which means that the criteria for each region are
more granular than they would be if there were only one or two
regions for the whole country. This granularity has the potential to
confer an appearance that the subsidy rates of each region are tied to
particular crop types, which could render a subsidy specific.193 When
2.1(a)–(b).
190. See Final Countervailing Memo, supra note 188, at 32–34; Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78, art. 2.1 (highlighting
“access” as being the key term in SCM Article 2.1 deciding subsidy specificity).
191. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78,
art. 2.1(a); Panel Report, supra note 84, ¶ 9.106 (finding that Chinese state-owned
commercial banks gave preferential lending to projects identified by the
government for “encouragement” and that the government’s list of specific
projects to support prevented non-encouraged projects from using the preferential
loans, thus restricting access to the subsidy); Access, supra note 177 (“to be able to
use, enter, or get near something”).
192. See Final Countervailing Memo, supra note 188, at 32–34; Understanding
the WTO, supra note 186.
193. Jabier Ruiz, Distribution of Direct Payments: The Peculiar Case of the
Spanish Model, CAP REFORM (Nov. 20, 2019), http://capreform.eu/distribution-of-
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Spain implemented the EU’s BPS and Greening subsidies, it had to
set the initial rate of each farmer’s subsidy entitlements.194 In
implementing BPS and Greening, the Government of Spain created
fifty agricultural subsidy regions in the country based on
combinations of characteristics such as whether the land was rain-fed
or irrigated, and whether the land was used for permanent crops or
permanent pastures.195 Most EU Member States have only one or two
subsidy regions, even large Member States like Italy and France.196
Spain’s large number of agricultural subsidy regions divide the
country into enough small pieces that the regions may appear to be
based on crop type.197 For example, Andalucía is one of the primary
olive-growing regions in Spain, and Andalucía is divided into at least
five subsidy regions that all share similar agronomic conditions and
farming practices.198 The multiple, small subsidy regions within a
larger, geographic region allow the government to more precisely
assign farms to a region.199 In Jaraíz de la Vera, two farmers whose
lands are adjacent, where one farms tobacco in the permanent crop
region of Jaraíz de la Vera, and the other raises cattle in the pastures
region, could be receiving widely different subsidy rates.200 While
BPS and Greening are not specific subsidies and are not coupled to
production of any one type of agricultural good, the precision with
which each farm is categorized into the fifty regions could imply that
the value of the entitlements is based on crop type and thus may
appear coupled to production.201 This appearance is not aided by the
direct-payments-the-peculiar-case-of-the-spanish-model/ (citing to the European
Court of Auditors).
194. Regulation 1307/2013, supra note 33, at 611.
195. See Preliminary Countervailing Memo, supra note 34, at 19–20; Ruiz,
supra note 193.
196. See Ruiz, supra note 193 (citing to the European Court of Auditors).
197. Id. (“Rain-fed and irrigated arable land uses were sometimes grouped
together in a single region, while permanent crops and permanent pastures were
always kept separate from each other and from arable land regions.”).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. (“[T]he average value of entitlements in other basic payment regions in
the farming county of Jaraíz de la Vera are €60/ha (pastures), €106/ha (rainfed
arable) and €167/ha (permanent crops).”).
201. See Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1075)
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BPS entitlement rates being based, in part, on preceding subsidy
rates.202 BPS rates partially derive from the Single Payment Scheme,
the rates of which were partially based on the preceding subsidy rates
of programs like the Common Market in Fats and Oils, which were
specific and expressly coupled to production.203
To eliminate the potential appearance of BPS and Greening being
coupled to agricultural production, and therefore specific, Spain
should accelerate the convergence of the fifty agricultural regions. 204
The rates in Spain were supposed to converge automatically between
2015–2019, but that goal was not met.205 Spain should make rate
convergence its priority for the next EU Common Agricultural

(Spain) (allowing farmers to be eligible for BPS payments if they own a hectare or
more of land used for agricultural activity); id. (“[T]here is an extreme outlier of
€1430/ha for one single region: Region 24.1 of Irrigated arable land in the county
of Jaraíz de la Vera, in Extremadura. The singularity of the irrigated agriculture in
this area is the cultivation of tobacco, which takes up approximately 8,500 ha
(more than half of the 15,678 entitlements available in Region 24.1).”). But see id.
(“However, even within [Andalucía, which is predominately olive farms], the most
favoured [sic] region averages €504/ha, another one €410/ha and the other three
between €300/ha and €340/ha. Considering that they share similar agronomic
conditions and farming practices, these differences are very difficult to explain.”).
202. See Regulation 864/2004, supra note 36, at 60 (showing that the
entitlement rates under BPS were derived from BPS’s predecessor subsidies
received by the particular farmer: SPS and its predecessor, in the case of olive
farmers, the Common Organization of Markets in Fats and Oils, which was
directly coupled to olive production); Royal Decree Concerning Allocation of
Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14
(B.O.E. 2014, 1076) (Spain) (setting the subsidy rates per hectare (the “entitlement
rate”)).
203. Regulation 864/2004, supra note 36, at 60 (amending the Single Payment
Scheme); Preliminary Countervailing Memo, supra note 34, at 22 (illustrating that
farmers growing olives for oil received a subsidy rate per hectare of 132.25/100kg
and farmers growing olives for eating (i.e., table olives) received a rate per hectare
that was equal to 11.5% of the olive oil rate, which works out to a rate of
15.2/100kg).
204. See Preliminary Countervailing Memo, supra note 34, at 24, 26 (“We
further preliminarily determine that the grants provided under this program are
specific . . . because the crop type determines the grant amounts provided under
this program due to the direct reliance on the grant amounts provided under
previous programs, which based grant amounts on the crop type. As such, the
program is specific to olive growers.”).
205. Ruiz, supra note 193.

694

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:3

Policy budget period from 2021–2027.206

C. THE WTO SHOULD PUBLISH A CLEAR TEST FOR WHETHER A
SUBSIDY IS LIMITED TO “CERTAIN ENTERPRISES” UNDER SCM
ARTICLE 2.1, AND NOT LEAVE THE LINE BETWEEN BROADLY AND
LIMITEDLY AVAILABLE SUBSIDIES TO BE DETERMINED BY PANELS
CASE-BY-CASE.

Article 2.1(a) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures states that a subsidy will be specific if access to the
subsidy is limited to “certain enterprises.”207 China challenged the
application of “certain enterprises” in US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China).208 The Appellate Body clarified that
“certain enterprises” referred to “a single enterprise or industry or a
class of enterprises or industries that are known and
particularized.”209 The Appellate Body acknowledged that this was
not a bright-line definition and a determination of “certain
enterprises” would have to be made on a case-by-case basis.210
While it may never be possible to create a definition that works
perfectly in all cases, the WTO should author a clear test for
determining limitation to “certain enterprises” that offers greater
concreteness than what is found in WTO jurisprudence. For example,
in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), the US
found that China granted preferential credit access to the off-the-road
tire subindustry, and that it was a specific subsidy. 211 The panel
206. Future of the Common Agricultural Policy, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agriculturalpolicy/future-cap_en (last accessed Nov. 6, 2020).
207. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 78, art.
2.1(a).
208. Appellate Body Report, United States – AD/CVD (China), supra note 81, ¶
386.
209. Id. ¶ 373.
210. Id.; see also Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, supra note 82, ¶ 7.1142
(“At some point that is not made precise in the text of the [SCM], and which may
modulate according to the particular circumstances of a given case, a subsidy
would cease to be specific because it is sufficiently broadly available throughout
an economy as not to benefit a particular limited group of producers of certain
products.”).
211. Appellate Body Report, United States – AD/CVD (China), supra note 81, ¶
397.
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upheld the US’ specificity determination because the Chinese policy
planning documents contained lists of projects to include or exclude
in China’s economic support programs, often including and
excluding projects from within the same economic sectors.212
Including and excluding different projects from within the same
economic sectors was illustrative of the subsidies being available to
only a discrete segment of the economy.213
The policy planning documents in US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China), with their express segmentation
language, made it readily apparent the subsidies were for a discrete
segment of the economy.214 But what about a case like US – Ripe
Olives from Spain? BPS and Greening are available to the whole
agriculture sector, but is agriculture still not a discrete segment of the
economy?215 Agriculture is but one industry in Spain that comprises
only 2.6% of its gross domestic product and BPS and Greening are
not available to the services and manufacturing sectors.216 Is
agriculture not a discrete segment because there are thousands of
different products within the “agriculture” umbrella?217
212. Panel Report, US – AD/CVD (China), supra note 84, ¶¶ 9.61–9.72.
213. See id. (showing that the subsidies were not broadly available throughout
the economy).
214. See id. (highlighting that the restrictions to access were expressly stated in
the policy planning documents).
215. See Royal Decree Concerning Implementation of Direct Payments to
Agriculture, Farming, and Other Aid Schemes §§ 3, 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1075)
(Spain) (defining agricultural activity as: “production, rearing[,] or agricultural
product cultivation, including harvesting, milking, animal husbandry, keeping of
animals for agricultural purposes[,] or maintenance of an agricultural area in a
suitable state for pasture or cultivation, without any preparatory measure beyond
the methods and agricultural machinery normally employed.”); Royal Decree
Concerning Allocation of Basic Payment Scheme Entitlements of the Common
Agricultural Policy §§ 13–14 (B.O.E. 2014, 1076) (Spain) (making eligible all
farmers owning one or more hectares of land used for “agricultural activity”).
216. See Income Support Explained, supra note 33 (explaining that BPS and
Greening are forms of income support under the EU’s Common Agriculture
Policy); Spain, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/spain (last visited July 25, 2020) (stating that, in 2017,
agriculture comprised 2.6% of Spain’s GDP).
217. See 7 U.S.C. § 1518 (2018) (“‘Agricultural commodity,’ as used in this
subchapter, means wheat, cotton, flax, corn, dry beans, oats, barley, rye, tobacco,
rice, peanuts, soybeans, sugar beets, sugar cane, tomatoes, grain sorghum,
sunflowers, raisins, oranges, sweet corn, dry peas, freezing and canning peas,
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WTO jurisprudence does not readily provide answers to these
questions.218 It would be prudent for the WTO to set clear guidance
for determining what constitutes “certain enterprises” so the
ambiguity is not left to be resolved through WTO panels on a caseby-case basis.219 Having a clear test for whether a subsidy is limited
to certain enterprises will aid countries to more accurately implement
countervailing duties, which will result in fewer disputes before the
WTO and allow the WTO to use its dispute resolution resources
more efficiently.

V. CONCLUSION
Because the US’ material injury determination adhered to the
requirements of Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the US’
anti-dumping duties on ripe olives from Spain are not inconsistent
with its WTO obligations. However, the US’ countervailing duties
on ripe olives from Spain are inconsistent with Article 2 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The
countervailing duties are in violation of Article 2 because the
countervailed subsidies, the Basic Payment Scheme and Greening,
are not specific subsidies. A decision by the US – Ripe Olives from
Spain WTO Dispute Settlement Body panel to this effect will
reinforce a plain-meaning interpretation of what “access” to a
subsidy means under SCM Article 2. The US should rescind its
countervailing duties, but maintain the anti-dumping duties, on ripe
olives from Spain.

forage, apples, grapes, potatoes, timber and forests, nursery crops, citrus, and other
fruits and vegetables, nuts, tame hay, native grass, hemp, aquacultural species
(including, but not limited to, any species of finfish, mollusk, crustacean, or other
aquatic invertebrate, amphibian, reptile, or aquatic plant propagated or reared in a
controlled or selected environment), or any other agricultural commodity,
excluding stored grain, determined by the Board, or any one or more of such
commodities, as the context may indicate.”).
218. See, e.g., Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82; Panel
Report, US – AD/CVD (China), supra note 84; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton,
supra note 82.
219. See, e.g., Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 82; Panel
Report, US – AD/CVD (China), supra note 84; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton,
supra note 82.

